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I. INTRODUCTION
The Judiciary may follow one of two distinguished paths in promoting
social change in countries equipped with strong-form judicial review.1
First, within the framework of traditional judicial review, the Judiciary
may declare a law unconstitutional, establish a precedent, and expect
compliance with it in subsequent cases. This is usually accompanied by an
award of damages, or some kind of individual redress.
On the other hand, the recognition of economic, social and cultural rights
as fundamental rights points to increasingly frequent cases in which the
Judiciary abandons a passive stance. In addition to enforcing a right, it finds
it must assume an active political role, urging the public authorities to adopt
a specific course of action or taking upon itself the management of a specific
social conflict. Where a violation of fundamental rights is due to the
defective operation of a bureaucratic organization, such constitutional
violation “cannot adequately be redressed through monetary compensation.”2
Therefore, the “need to fulfill the court’s remedial duty justifies the use of
structural injunctions to remedy public law violations”3 in which the aim is
to “restructure public agencies”4 and to give “meaning to our constitutional
values in the operation of these organizations.”5
In the United States, the device used by the Judiciary to perform this
managerial role has been the structural injunction, issued within the sphere of
what is known as “Public Law Litigation.” It is a device whereby the court
not only strikes down a statute or a public policy as unconstitutional but also
retains jurisdiction and seeks to enforce the judgment within the framework
of a “polycentric”6 conflict. Understanding that conflicts regarding groups or
collective rights are ultimately decided in the day-to-day operation of these
bureaucracies, the focus of court action is on the future remedy rather than
on the enforcement of rights in individual cases.
1
See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND SOCIAL
WELFARE RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (2008) (defining “strong-form
judicial review” as a system in which judicial interpretations of the Constitution are final and
unrevisable by ordinary legislative majorities).
2
Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. L.J. 1357, 1378
(1991).
3
Id. at 1379.
4
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1016 (2004).
5
Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
6
See Lon L. Fuller & Kenneth I. Winston, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978) (defining “polycentric” conflicts as those with complex and
interacting points of influence that can only be resolved by managerial direction or contract).
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In recent years, several countries have regarded the American experience
in this field as a path to follow.7 Thus, courts in countries like Argentina
have adopted an activist approach relying on the prestige of the U.S.
Supreme Court. However, the actual impact and results of judicially driven
reforms are still under debate.
These facts offer us the opportunity to contrast the experiences in both
countries to answer a basic question: what are the conditions under which
Public Law Litigation is effective?
The aim of this Article is to answer that question using the comparative
method. We first seek to describe Public Law Litigation and the use of
structural remedies in the United States and in Argentina, aligning
similarities, linkages, and differences. Then, the insight gathered will allow
us to identify a set of generally valid principles and standards for the
effective implementation of these complex procedural devices.
To accomplish these goals, the analysis has been organized as follows:
Part II reviews the experience of Public Law Litigation in the United
States and examines some lessons to be learned from its case law.
Part III argues that it is possible and useful to draw a comparison between
the American and Argentine legal experiences, establishing the relevant
contact points. Then, it describes the cases in which the Supreme Court of
Argentina has used structural remedies in the context of Public Law
Litigation.
Based on this comparative analysis, Part IV identifies and describes the
political conditions and technical requirements needed to obtain effective
results. This schematic description makes up a model that may prove useful
to assess and guide this controversial driver of social change.
Finally, Part V states the general conclusions that may be drawn from this
study.
II. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Public Law Litigation and structural remedies were born in the United
States within the framework of the civil rights cases of the mid-twentieth
century. This was the area in which “most courts gained their familiarity
with public law litigation,” and these cases “shaped how federal courts
would cope with public law litigation generally.”8
7

See David Landau, The Reality of Social Rights Enforcement, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 189,
235–37 (2012).
8
Peter A. Appel, Intervention in Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78
WASH. U. L.Q. 215, 222 (2000).
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Therefore, we will now focus on the most important milestones in the use
of structural remedies in the field of racial desegregation of public schools,
and will then make some specific comments concerning the area of prison
reform. Naturally, it is impossible to provide an exhaustive account of all of
the cases relevant in this regard, so we will consider only those that are the
most meaningful for the purpose of this Article.
A. Racial Desegregation in Schools
Apart from some prior use in specific cases, the rise and definitive
establishment of Public Law Litigation came with the racial desegregation
process in public schools following Brown v. Board of Education9 and its
progeny. This case is no doubt paradigmatic and a key to understanding the
subsequent development of structural remedies in different areas of the law.10
This holds true not only for the United States but also for many other
countries, including Argentina, as Brown came to exemplify globally “the
possibility that lawyers could structure and execute a litigation strategy
designed to produce substantial changes in the law.”11
Still, while Brown is one of the most celebrated cases for its profound
moral significance, the specific procedural measures adopted to implement
such strategy, and the use of structural remedies by the courts over the years,
have also met with heavy criticism.
As is well-known, this famous decision of the Supreme Court came in the
wake of a long judicial strategy pursued by the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), which adopted this course of
action on numerous fronts of interest to the African-American population.
The Supreme Court’s holding that de jure segregation violated the
Fourteenth Amendment extended to all public educational institutions. It
affected the legislation of twenty-one states that required or expressly
permitted a segregated educational system at the state level under the
“separate-but-equal” doctrine.12 This doctrine was expressly repealed in
Brown, in which it was concluded that “separate educational facilities are

9

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Mark Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 FORDHAM L.
REV. 23 (1992). Accord Appel, supra note 8, at 222; Fiss, supra note 5, at 2; Myriam E. Gilles,
Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of
Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1390 (2000).
11
Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 VA. L. REV. 1693,
1693 (2004).
12
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
10
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inherently unequal.”13
The ruling was a typical declaration of
unconstitutionality, with immediate legal effects.
But, as the decision did not explicitly include any kind of “remedy” or
practical consequence, the ruling was anything but complied with, and the
Supreme Court had to issue a new decision to define how to carry out the
enforcement duties.
It took one more year to address the issue, and still nothing significant
was decided. In the case known as Brown II, the Supreme Court ruled that,
in view of local peculiarities, the trial courts in each jurisdiction had to deal
with this issue; such trial courts were to issue judgments urging public
schools to admit students under a non-discrimination standard “with all
deliberate speed.”14 In a way, the Supreme Court extricated itself from the
problem of implementation and “delegated the reconstructive task to the
lower federal judges.”15
The stage beginning at this point was marked by the lone efforts of the
lower courts, indifference from the other branches of the federal government,
and stiff opposition by parts of the local governments in the southern states.
From 1955 to 1964, the federal lower courts engaged in intense, wideranging activity, while the Supreme Court issued at least three decisions in
which it emphatically insisted on steering the course originally set.16
However, in 1963, nine years after Brown I, resistance to change was still
substantial; the results were not as expected, and at least two attempts to
eschew the desegregation order needed to be halted by a ruling of
unconstitutionality.
Thus, in the period spanning from 1954 to 1964, the Supreme Court and
the lower courts deployed considerable efforts to achieve racial
desegregation in schools and the operation of a “unitary” system. But theirs
was a single-handed endeavor, unaided by the otherwise decisive support of
the other branches of the federal government. As Rosenberg notes, during
this decade of intense judicial activity, “virtually nothing happened.”17
The situation changed only in 1964. Unlike the prior stage, this year saw
a great deal of activity in Congress and the Executive. As indicated by
Rosenberg, it was only in 1964 that a Civil Rights Act was enacted that
actually had a significant impact and entailed the decisive support of the
13

Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
15
Fiss, supra note 5, at 3.
16
Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Goss v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 683
(1963); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
17
GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 52 (2d ed. 2008).
14
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political branches of the federal government.18 The Attorney General was
once again authorized to bring actions on behalf of affected individuals, and
it became possible to deny federal funds to school districts engaged in racial
discrimination. In comparison with this initiative positively involving the
political branches of government, the actions of the Judiciary “appear
irrelevant.”19
As far as the judicial sphere is concerned, from 1964 to 1968 the Supreme
Court did not render any significant decisions. But in 1968 its work gathered
steam, and in Green v. Board of New Kent County it issued the first judgment
in which the Supreme Court itself defined standards and factors to determine
whether a desegregation plan was constitutionally acceptable. Later, in
1969, the Supreme Court decided Alexander v. Holmes County, in which it
stated that the time to act under the “with all deliberate speed” standard had
run out and schools must desegregate immediately.20
With a Judiciary acting in full exercise of its authority, accompanied by
decisive action on the part of the political branches of the federal government
and with the support of a majority of public opinion, tangible results began to
emerge. Resistance waned, and local authorities gradually complied with
judicial remedies.21
At this point, an initial stage came to a close and another one started in
which the courts were confronted with the much harder problem of
segregation in urban areas. In rural districts, which only had one or two
schools, the issue was not particularly challenging. By contrast, urban areas
with hundreds of schools revealed that “although Brown succeeded in
eliminating de jure segregation, it fell short of eliminating de facto
segregation.”22
Faced with this reality, the courts sought to use a different type of
intervention and began to employ more ambitious remedies, such as
“busing.” This remedy consisted of a court-ordered, mandatory public
transportation program aimed at ensuring racial integration in terms of
proportional representation within a specific school district. The program
18

Id. at 49–54.
Id. at 52; accord Michael J. Klarman, Unfinished Business: Racial Equality, in AMERICAN
HISTORY 213–19 (2007); Martin R. West & Joshua M. Dunn, The Supreme Court as School
Board Revisited, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN
AMERICAN EDUCATION 3, 7 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009).
20
Green v. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Alexander v. Holmes Cnty., 396
U.S. 19 (1969).
21
See ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 52–53.
22
Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2417, 2421
(2004).
19

2015]

PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION

457

included the transportation of children to places somewhat distant from their
homes in order to reverse the underlying trend that a particular ethnic group
prevailed in certain neighborhoods. This new approach was upheld by the
Supreme Court in Green23 and Swann.24
It is clear that the courts went from a minimalist and incremental
approach to a maximalist approach geared toward resolving not only the
immediate constitutional controversy but also an underlying social conflict.
In the case of racial segregation, the courts were not content with banning de
jure discrimination; rather, they also sought to shift demographic patterns,
internal migrations, school budgets, relative income, etc. The court system
thus firmly focused on coping with a conflict that was polycentric in nature
by using a set of far-reaching structural remedies that were designed as rights
by the Judiciary and, as a result, not afforded much flexibility.
This approach met with resistance, social protest, and the reaction of
certain communities that felt invaded by federal policy.25 In this specific
case, a process began to develop that sociologist James S. Coleman has
defined as “white flight,”26 defined as the large-scale migration to school
districts that were not affected by the busing policy or going over to the
private school system. Given the underlying conditions that were the
product of different income patterns, the intervention of the courts
paradoxically created an unwanted incentive to the development of an
educational system for the rich. It has been argued in this regard that busing
was a decisive factor in demographic and migration trends.27
In an effort to address the white flight problem, some courts responded by
adopting a more expansive stance: they extended the mandatory
transportation order to neighboring districts, thus forcing children to travel
increasingly longer distances from their homes. But in deciding Milliken,28
the Supreme Court ruled that the busing policy was not to apply to children
in communities with no record of de jure racial segregation.
Therefore, the scant flexibility of the scheme, supported by unilateral
judicial decisions endowed with the aura of enforcing constitutional rights,
23

391 U.S. 430 (1968).
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
25
See LUCAS A. POWE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789–2008, at 268–
70 (2009); Susan Olzak et al., School Desegregation, Interracial Exposure, and Antibusing
Activity in Contemporary Urban America, 100 AM. J. SOC. 196, 232 (1994).
26
See generally JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL., TRENDS IN SCHOOL SEGREGATION 1968–73
(1975).
27
See DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 170–76
(1996).
28
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
24
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led in many places to an exodus from public schools, as well as to their
gradual impoverishment, stigmatization and more acute racial segregation
than before the implementation of the remedies.
Finally, in 1991, the Supreme Court helmed by Chief Justice Rehnquist
decided in Dowell29 that schools could not remain indefinitely under judicial
supervision and that it was time to return control to the local authorities in
order for them to find suitable and flexible policies to accommodate each
need. By then, there were more than 800 school districts under judicial
supervision. Additionally, in deciding Freeman v. Pitts in 1992, the
Supreme Court put an end to judicial maximalism, holding that private
actions cannot be judged under constitutional standards and that it was
“beyond the practical ability of the federal courts to try to counteract these
kinds of continuous and massive demographic shifts.”30 Within this context,
there are studies showing that racial resegregation has been a wellentrenched trend since the early 1980s.31 On the strength of this evidence,
several authors maintain that unilateral, top-down remedies like busing have
failed.32
What followed during the 1990s was a gradual decline in the use of
structural remedies within the framework of racial desegregation in
schools.33 The courts began to focus on how and when to terminate judicial
intervention in public school management.34 Evidence revealed a picture
that was “far from pretty, further complicating Brown’s legacy, and serving
as yet another reminder of the limits of well-intentioned efforts to improve
educational practice, policy, and results through litigation.”35 Hence the
many voices that express criticism at the managerial role of the courts in the
quest for educational reform.
While there is no question about the efficacy of Brown in terminating de
jure segregation, the subsequent judicial intervention had rights and wrongs,
29

Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
31
See GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1997).
32
See, e.g., ARMOR, supra note 27; CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL, THE CARROT OR THE STICK FOR
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION POLICY: MAGNET SCHOOLS OR FORCED BUSING (1991); Daniel Kiel,
Exploded Dream: Desegregation in the Memphis City Schools, 26 LAW & INEQ. 261 (2008).
33
Bradley W. Joondeph, Skepticism and School Desegregation, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 161
(1998); Dennis Schapiro, Looking for Justice in All the Wrong Places: Reflections on the End
of the School Desegregation Era, 17 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 323, 323 (1996).
34
Michael , Assessing the Efficacy of School Desegregation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1093,
1096 (1996); Gary Orfield & David Thronson, Dismantling Desegregation: Uncertain Gains,
Unexpected Costs, 42 EMORY L.J. 759, 759 (1993).
35
Heise, supra note 22, at 2419.
30
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leading to mixed results or to results that were paradoxically detrimental to
those groups that the courts purported to benefit. Most authors conclude
today that “before Congress and the executive branch acted, courts had
virtually no direct effect”36 and that “the courtroom is rarely the optimal
venue for education policymaking.”37
Furthermore, over the long term, social reaction to unilateral, mandatory,
and hardly flexible judicial intervention has stoked resistance moves that
have delayed ongoing integration processes. In some cases, this even
prompted the contention that “gradual resegregation, already in progress
even in ‘successfully’ desegregated districts, will likely persist,” which is
why “Brown’s legacy in this context is aptly characterized as one of
unfulfilled promise.”38
B. Prison Reform
Mark Tushnet explains that after “gaining experience in supervising
important bureaucratic institutions in the school setting, the lower courts
began extending their supervision to other institutions similarly regulated by
the Constitution.”39 Thus, as soon as the issue of prison conditions raised
some interest among public opinion, the Judiciary embarked on a reform of
the system with the tools developed in the area of racial desegregation in
schools.
Two circumstances converged in the United States in the second half of
the twentieth century that would be key to provoking a change in the role of
the Judiciary in this field.
On the one hand, from a sociological standpoint, there was an exponential
increase in prison population beginning in the mid-twentieth century,40 which
brought with it escalating problems of overcrowding, corruption, illtreatment, or violence in prisons. The plight gained public visibility with the
riots of the late 1950s, and thus found its place on the civil rights agenda that
was then gathering momentum.
On the other hand, on the strictly judicial front, the Warren Court began
to identify inmates as one of the “discrete and insular minorities”41 deserving
36

ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 70.
West & Dunn, supra note 19, at 4.
38
Heise, supra note 22, at 2419; see also CHARLES J. OGLETREE JR., ALL DELIBERATE
SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (2005)
(arguing that Brown failed to effectively promote integration).
39
Tushnet, supra note 10, at 25.
40
Peter Finn, Judicial Responses to Prison Crowding, 67 JUDICATURE 318, 319 (1984).
41
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
37
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the protection of the federal courts. Additionally, the enforcement of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause led to the slow abandonment of the
“hands-off” policy that prevented federal interference in state penal conflicts,
first clearly stated in 1866 in Pervear v. Massachusetts.42 Driven by the
judicial victories of the NAACP, and with the support of a radical change in
public opinion and in that of political leaders at the federal level, the
Judiciary began to adopt structural injunctions to reform the prison system.
Change unfolded in stages. In cases like Trop v. Dulles,43 the Supreme
Court said that there were “evolving standards of decency” that necessarily
influenced the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Subsequently, in
Robinson v. California,44 the Supreme Court extended this federal
constitutional clause to the states, holding unconstitutional a California State
law for violation of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and
unusual punishment. In Jones v. Cunningham,45 the Supreme Court admitted
that inmates subject to state jurisdiction had the right to file a writ of habeas
corpus challenging the conditions of their imprisonment as well as its legality
under Federal Constitution standards.46 Finally, in Cooper v. Pate,47 it ruled
that state prison inmates have standing to sue in federal court under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.48
From then on, there was a proliferation of class actions and collective
lawsuits. The “hands-off” judicial tenet was abolished forever.49 The federal
courts were allowed to interfere and urged to attempt a full transformation of
state prisons.50 It was within this legal framework that decisions provided
for large-scale structural reforms.
A myriad of cases should be cited if a complete historical review were to
be attempted of the developments in this area of judicial intervention during
the 1970s. For the sake of brevity, only the most significant are discussed.
Common to all of them is that they entailed massive intervention in the
prison system and the establishment by the Judiciary of extensive plans,
formulated down to the smallest detail, setting out guidelines for the
management of prison facilities.
42

72 U.S. 475 (1866).
356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
44
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
45
371 U.S. 236 (1963).
46
Id. at 236–43.
47
378 U.S. 546 (1964).
48
GEORGE F. COLE ET AL., THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 534 (2014).
49
Id.
50
Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions Over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 558–64 (2006).
43
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In the 1969 case, Holt v. Sarver,51 the Supreme Court declared several
aspects of Arkansas’ prison system unconstitutional. Injunctive relief was
ordered in subsequent decisions including the obligation to establish
guidelines to follow for correcting the problems; a court ordered
administrators to report on the progress of the implementation of these
guidelines and, later, directed the State Correction Board to devise a plan of
action.52 From this point onwards, the courts began to weigh the “cumulative
effect” of conditions of confinement by prisoners as a test for establishing a
possible constitutional violation.53
Along the same lines, mention should be made of the landmark ruling in
Pugh v. Locke,54 a case deriving from a class action filed by Alabama prison
inmates. In an appendix to its decision, the District Court instituted the
“Minimum Constitutional Standards for Inmates of Alabama Penal System,”
consisting of a detailed prison management plan to be supervised by a
Human Rights Committee for the Alabama Prison System.55 As a result, the
administrative authorities of the Alabama Board of Corrections became
subject to the court’s supervision.56
Last, particularly noteworthy is Ruiz v. Estelle,57 decided by a Texas
federal court. This case provides the most telling example of how far
judicial intervention went in regulating conditions of prison incarceration.
Again, an individual petition led to a class action alleging that overcrowding,
lack of access to health care, and abusive security practices were a violation
of the U.S. Constitution.58 The legacy was more than a decade of litigation
in the form of consent decrees, appeals, and other legal actions, and despite a
certain amount of progress, compliance problems recurred.59
We now approach the last stage in this path charted by the courts—a
phase marked by a state of virtual saturation, legislative reaction calculated
to curb the expansion of judicial intervention, and, in the end, progressive
disengagement. The early 1990s showed that the courts were, for all
practical purposes, in charge of managing prison facilities and that “virtually
51

300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969).
See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE
MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 59–66 (2000).
53
L. Lee Boatright, Note, Federal Courts and State Prison Reform: A Formula for Large
Scale Federal Intervention into State Affairs, 14 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 545, 547 (1980).
54
406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
55
Id. at 332–37.
56
Id. at 331.
57
503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
58
Id. at 1275–76.
59
See BEN M. CROUCH & JAMES W. MARQUART, AN APPEAL TO JUSTICE: LITIGATED
REFORM OF TEXAS PRISONS 226–38 (2010).
52
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every facet of institutional life has been constitutionalized in ways that
directly affect prisons and jails in all fifty states.”60
As the system matured, orders were no longer issued unilaterally, topdown from the courts. Judicial intervention evolved into consent decrees
drafted within multilateral negotiation processes involving administrative
authorities and class action representatives. In all cases, this meant that
jurisdiction was retained over long periods, which was “frequently
accompanied by an increase in supervision” and the use of “contempt
citations”61 to enforce inflexible plans. Moreover, the courts delegated their
authority and relied especially on the support of special masters, who “are
able to oversee the daily operation of prisons and administer the details of
court orders after the case is decided.”62
Over time, opinion of both the public and the federal government shifted.
Both shifts pointed to the counterproductive effects of judicial intervention.
The increased expense necessarily entailed by an improvement of conditions
in prison facilities was to blame for the unavailability of funds necessary to
build new prisons or improve other aspects of crime prevention policies.
Also, public opinion began to turn its attention to the large number of
frivolous claims. The attendant clogging of the courts and administrative
overload became apparent. At the same time, a number of studies
“suggested that judicial intervention resulted in increased violence in
prison,”63 as a consequence of the “diminishing authority of correctional
officers”64 and, in general, of the “climate of uncertainty and disruption of
the prison administration autonomy,”65 all of which had an impact on the
increase in the crime rate.66

60
Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Handson, The Impact of Judicial Intervention on Prisons
and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and Review of the Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION ON PRISONS AND JAILS 13
(John J. Di lulio ed., 1990); accord STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH?: CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 95 (2002).
61
BRADLEY S. CHILTON, PRISONS UNDER THE GAVEL: THE FEDERAL COURT TAKEOVER OF
GEORGIA PRISONS 55 (1991).
62
POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 98.
63
Id. at 100.
64
Id.; see also LARRY E. SULLIVAN, THE PRISON REFORM MOVEMENT: FORLORN HOPE 92
(1990); Kathleen Engel & Stanley Rothman, Prison Violence and the Paradox of Reform, 73
PUB. INT. 91, 91–105 (1983).
65
POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 101.
66
ROSS SANDLER & DAVID SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN
COURTS RUN GOVERNMENT 187 (2003).
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Two courses of action aimed at reversing this situation are worthy of
note. First, in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,67 the Supreme Court
sought to set parameters allowing for consent decrees to be more flexible and
easy to modify. Within this context, it also held that “[f]inancial constraints
may not be used to justify the creation or perpetuation of constitutional
violations, but they are a legitimate concern of government defendants in
institutional reform litigation and therefore are appropriately considered in
tailoring a consent decree modification.”68
Second, a turn in public opinion and political support surfaced as
Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)69 of 1996. The
goal was to decrease the incidence of litigation within the management of
prison conditions. Among other things, it provided that a court “shall not
grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief
is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation
of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the
violation of the Federal right.”70 “Automatic stay” and “exhaustion”
mechanisms were also introduced as a way of limiting access to the courts.71
These factors, added to an increasing conservatism of the federal bench.
Doctrinal innovations of the mid-1990s restricting injunctive remedies and
declining funding for inmates’ advocates72 account for the downward trend
in this field.
C. Overall Assessment
The cases involving issues of racial desegregation in schools and of
prison reform are the examples of Public Law Litigation that have grabbed
most of the attention. Similar patterns, drawn along comparable lines, can be
observed in environmental law cases and in the reform of mental health
institutions. Leaving aside certain ideological stances, today’s U.S. legal
literature shows that structural injunctions have, at best, a limited impact73
and may cause paradoxical or counterproductive effects.
As far as desegregation in schools is concerned, evidence suggests that a
model of unilateral judicial intervention providing for mandatory plans
67

502 U.S. 367 (1992).
Id. at 392.
69
Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801–810, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to 1321-77 (1996).
70
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (2000).
71
Id.
72
Schlanger, supra note 50, at 590.
73
See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 340–42
(1996); SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at 6.
68
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sought to be applied against the active resistance of the political powers or
large sections of public opinion is usually ineffective. It might be argued
that this kind of intervention can be justified on the grounds that it is
instrumental in placing the issue on the public agenda, thus fostering debate
and the development of solutions.74 While this political impact is impossible
to measure, critical authors claim that its downside effects include the
demobilization of interest groups,75 the misapplication of scarce financial and
human resources,76 and the ensuing possibility that politicians will shy away
from the underlying conflict, which thus becomes the sole responsibility of
the courts.77
This is why, even when it comes to bringing these conflicts onto the
political arena, the overall assessment may also prove to be negative.
Specifically, scholars have highlighted the delaying effect of the judicial
strategy in the realm of racial integration78 apparently stemming from the
fact that “the black community’s belief in the efficacy of litigation inhibited
the development of techniques involving popular participation and
control.”79

74
See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 19 (explaining the “agenda-setting” effect of Brown,
although mentioning that opinion on race was educated far more by the civil rights movement
than by litigation); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994) (arguing that sometimes litigation can be a catalyst
for social movements).
75
Authors enrolled in the Critical Legal Studies movement consider that the litigation
strategy is ineffective in achieving its objectives, counterproductive, and conservative in
reinforcing structures of subordination. See, e.g., MICHAEL W. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM
SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM (1986); Lani Guinier, From
Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestDivergence Dilemma, 91 J. AM. HIST. 92 (2004); Kenneth W. Mack, Rethinking Civil Rights
Lawyering and Politics in the Era Before Brown, 115 YALE L.J. 256 (2005); Reva Siegel,
Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State
Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1132–45 (1997).
76
Klarman, supra note 19, at 219 (claiming that after Brown, litigation and direct action
competed for scarce resources).
77
See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 102; SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at
139; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 173 (1999).
78
See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 156; Kiel, supra note 32, at 261 (arguing that the
use of structural remedies such as busing served as a “death knell” for effective integration);
Gerald N. Rosenberg, Brown, Is Dead! Long Live Brown!: The Endless Attempt to Canonize a
Case, 80 VA. L. REV. 161 (1994). But see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and
the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994) (arguing that Brown indirectly accelerated
the pace of racial change by crystallizing southern white resistance, which in turn led to
violent confrontation and then national intervention in the form of civil rights legislation).
79
Derrick A. Bell Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 514 (1976).
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A review of the results in the area of prison reform invites a similar
conclusion. Although it is perceived as one of the few areas in which the
courts have been “relatively successful,”80 it is not clear that any such
success was necessarily a product of judicial intervention. Some studies
indicate that most prison construction is not in response to lawsuits, and that
after more than a decade of litigation, prison overcrowding continued to be a
problem.81
At the same time, similarly to desegregation in schools, unilateral and
inflexible models led to resistance and counterproductive effects. As noted
above, judicial intervention proved ineffective in securing budgetary
resources,82 and it led to diminished authority slackening in prisons83 and to
increased violence among inmates,84 and in some cases, to a rise in the crime
rate.85 As happened with the educational reform, public opinion has
eventually turned its back on this kind of approach.86
Still, all of the cases examined above have some positive points from
which helpful conclusions may be drawn to formulate principles for a
productive use of structural remedies.
In general, present-day authors suggest that judicially-driven reforms are
advisable only in those cases in which the legal and political system allows
for the implementation of a “multilateral”87 or “experimentalist”88 model in
which the court operates more as a “power broker”89 or “negotiator”90 than as
80

Malcolm M. Feeley, Implementing Court Orders in the United States: Judges as
Executives, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND BUREAUCRATIC IMPACT 221, 223 (Marc Herthog &
Simon Halliday eds., 2004); accord POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 108.
81
See Peter M. Koneazny & Karl D. Schwartz, Preface to The Colloquium: The Prison
Overcrowding Crisis, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (1984).
82
Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 735, 775 (1992).
83
POWERS & ROTHMAN, supra note 60, at 111.
84
See id. at 96; ROSENBERG, supra note 17, at 307; James W. Marquart & Ben M. Crouch,
Judicial Reform and Prisoner Control: The Impact of Ruiz v. Estelle on a Texas Penitentiary,
19 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 557, 575 (1985).
85
SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at 187.
86
See Schlanger, supra note 50, at 571.
87
David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and
Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1021 (2004) (dividing commentators on
institutional reform litigation into “unilateralists” who focus on judges and “multilateralists”
who look at other participants as well).
88
Sabel & Simon, supra note 4, at 1016.
89
See, e.g., ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIAN
SOCIAL THEORY IN THE SERVICE OF RADICAL DEMOCRACY 530 (1987); Colin S. Diver, The
Judge as Political Powerbroker: Superintending Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65
VA. L. REV. 43, 77–88 (1979).
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the fount of public policies. This conception entails open rules of procedure,
molding the litigation proceeding into a participatory setting—a forum in
which the parties involved may be at liberty to agree on the steps to be taken
to achieve reform. The cornerstone of this approach is, therefore, the ability
of the courts to promote the engagement of political authorities and class
representatives, such that coordinated efforts may result in a sustainable
impact in the long term.
Beyond this multilateral model—inherently difficult to carry out in
practice—the review of Public Law Litigation and the use of structural
remedies in the United States lays bare that these types of devices have lost
momentum, are past their climax, and, in most cases, fall short of
expectations. This explains why the overall picture today reveals that
“ ‘structural injunctions’ have receded from the remedial scene.”91
III. PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION IN ARGENTINA
A. The Case of Argentina: Why it is Relevant
For purposes of this comparative study, an analysis of the situation in
Argentina has several interesting sides to it. First, Argentina is one of the
few countries in the region with both a vast catalog of social, economic, and
cultural rights afforded constitutional rank and a model of strong-form
judicial review92 almost identical to that in the United States.
Moreover, “structural injunction-like devices have been rare in
comparative constitutional law,”93 and within this context, Argentina appears
as “one of the few countries that has actually attempted structural
remedies.”94 This peculiarity can be accounted for by the recent adoption of
a model of an activist Supreme Court, which seeks to gain legitimacy before
90

See R. Shep Melnick, Taking Remedies Seriously: Can Courts Control Public Schools?,
in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION,
supra note 19, at 17, 29; accord Catherine Y. Kim, Procedures for Public Law Remediation in
School-to-Prison Pipeline Litigation: Lessons Learned from Antoine v. Winner School
District, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 955, 961–62 (2009/10); Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero
Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994, 2012 (1999);
Sturm, supra note 2, at 1438.
91
Marsha S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REV. 519, 525 (2004); accord Myriam
Gilles, An Autopsy of the Structural Reform Injunction: Oops . . . It’s Still Moving!, 58 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 143–44 (2003); Russell L. Weaver, The Rise and Decline of Structural
Remedies, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1617 (2004).
92
See TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 33.
93
Landau, supra note 7, at 235.
94
Id. at 235 n.246.
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public opinion and earn for itself a place in the political dynamics. Ricardo
L. Lorenzetti, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Argentina, explains this
legitimacy-seeking strategy as follows:
In a not very distant future, we hope to have a Judiciary that
takes on and performs the role of cooperating in the large
transformations needed in our country. And I say this because
the judicial branches of government have historically been
conceived as vehicles for preservation of the existing order; but
in the last few years, much has been done in the realms of legal
scholarship, jurisprudence, and all the areas in which we are
usually involved toward seeing the Judiciary as an institutional
player that is also engaged in the transformation of society and
not merely in its preservation. And in this transformation of
society, we have a most significant part to play. . . . In this
regard, the Judiciary, together with the other branches of
government, must operate as a driver of institutional
transformation by means of judicial and institutional decisions
alike. . . . This is thus the role that we envision for the
Judiciary: an active participant role in the public agenda of
fundamental civic issues, oriented toward transformation and
allowing for participation in major government decisions.95
Second, Argentina provides an apposite case for a comparative study in
view of the profound influence that American constitutional law has
historically had there. Following the constitutional conventions of 1853 and
1860, Argentina promulgated its first formal constitution patterned primarily
on American constitutional thought. Although the Argentine constitutional
process drew on other specific influences, it remains true that the design of
the fundamental structure of the Argentine Constitution was guided by the
letter and the spirit of the U.S. Constitution.96 As stated by José Benjamín
Gorostiaga, intellectual leader of the 1853 Constitutional Convention, the

95
See Ricardo L. Lorenzetti, C.J., Sup. Ct. of Argentina, Opening Speech for the Judicial
Year 2011 (Feb. 22, 2011), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1D6P9ApajUc.
96
See, e.g., MANUEL J. GARCÍA-MANSILLA & RICARDO RAMÍREZ CALVO, LAS FUENTES DE
But see RODOLFO RIVAROLA, LA CONSTITUCIÓN
LA CONSTITUCIÓN NACIONAL (2006).
ARGENTINA Y SUS PRINCIPIOS DE ÉTICA POLÍTICA (1944) (criticizing the opinion that the
Argentine Constitution is merely a copy of the U.S. Constitution and may be fairly interpreted
by applying U.S. precedents).
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Argentine Constitution was “cast in the mold of the Constitution of the
United States.”97
Despite obvious historical and cultural differences between both
countries, Argentina followed the U.S. Constitution in laying the
groundwork for its organization. Thus, Argentina adopted a written
Constitution providing for a federal government, presidentialist in form, with
a system of separated and coordinated powers that exercise reciprocal checks
and balances, and limited by a bill of rights. In addition, expressly citing
Marbury v. Madison,98 the Supreme Court of Argentina espoused strongform judicial review, as theretofore exercised by its counterpart in the United
States.99 Consequently, to the extent that there are fundamental constituent
elements common to both countries and that the Supreme Court of Argentina
continues to be strongly influenced by its American counterpart, it may be
asserted that a comparison of both legal systems is pertinent and there are
lessons to be drawn from one system for consideration in the other.
There is, however, an obvious distinguishing trait of particular
significance to the issues under consideration. Argentina is a civil law
country while the structural remedies granted within the framework of Public
Law Litigation may be seen as a logical and foreseeable development of the
social rulemaking function traditionally associated with the role of common
law judges.100
In this regard, it has been stated that the various players within the
common law system accept “that one of the hallmarks of public law
litigation is that it will generate norms that govern people not parties to the
litigation,”101 meaning that it is accepted from both a legal and a political
standpoint that litigation can have “important consequences for many
persons including absentees.”102 Naturally, this approach defines both the
way in which judges and lawyers understand that their work should be done
and the expectations held by society in this regard.
This difference is not confined to the sphere of judicial culture, but rather
takes a concrete form in certain characteristics of the law of procedure, such
97

4 EMILIO RAVIGNIANI, ASAMBLEAS CONSTITUYENTES ARGENTINAS 468 (1939).
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
99
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
20/9/1887, “Sojo v. Cámara de Diputados,” Fallos (1887-32-120) (Arg.).
100
Fiss, supra note 5, at 36 (arguing that the function of courts under the common law was
paradigmatically not dispute resolution, but to give meaning to public values through the
enforcement and creation of public norms).
101
Appel, supra note 8, at 221.
102
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1302 (1976).
98
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as the regulation of class actions and the existence of equitable jurisdiction
(which gives rise to the remedies known generically as equitable relief and,
as a part thereof, the widespread category of injunctions). As noted by
Argentine scholars, “the strong legalistic and administrative-leaning tradition
of continental European law, which has influenced Argentine law to such a
large degree, departs, to our detriment, from the generous intervention of
common law judges in shaping the operation of class actions.”103
It follows that a comparative analysis and the development of a set of
practical rules aimed at establishing when and under what factual and legal
circumstances structural remedies can be effective should only be undertaken
with the understanding that any difficulties or limitations that may have been
encountered in the United States in this field are coupled by the challenges
posed by a law of procedure typical of a civil law system and a legal culture
flowing from the continental European tradition.
B. Institutional Alternatives
When faced with a polycentric conflict in which the broad catalog of
fundamental rights embraced by the Constitution may become subject to
judicial review and enforcement of the judgment should be mediated through
government agencies, the Argentine Judiciary can choose from a wide
variety of options.
A first alternative available to the Argentine courts, just like to their
counterparts in the United States, consists of making use of some of “passive
virtues”104 and avoiding or postponing a final judgment in the hope that the
conflict will be better resolved on the political front. The Supreme Court of
Argentina has followed the line of decisions adopted by the U.S. Supreme
Court whereby constitutional review is limited to the existence of a
justiciable “case or controversy.”105 As a result, the courts have leeway to
act strategically and to rely on both procedural defects and substantive
doctrines (such as those concerning political questions, legislative or
administrative discretion, ripeness, mootness, and lack of standing) to avoid
making rash decisions.
103

HUMBERTO QUIROGA LAVIÉ, EL AMPARO COLECTIVO 171 (1998).
See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111–98 (2d ed. 1986).
105
Despite the current trend toward eliminating formal barriers for access to the courts, there
are still numerous examples of the traditional view in present-day case law. See, e.g., Corte
Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], “Compañía de
Transmisión del Mercosur,” Fallos (2009-332-1433) (Arg.).
104
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In addition, as the Argentine system is a federal system, the courts have
the possibility of raising procedural issues to have the case removed to other
jurisdictions.106 Specifically in connection with social rights, the courts may,
under certain circumstances, invoke the absence of adequate legal
regulation,107 the principle of “progressive realization,”108 or a lack of
budgetary resources.
A second alternative available to the courts is to issue a decision
upholding the claim before them while ensuring that such decision will not
impact directly on public policy or on the underlying social conditions.
Decisions rendered on a case-by-case basis may thus sustain the complaints
filed without probing into the deep causes of the source conflict.
Using this minimalist approach, the Argentine Supreme Court has issued
favorable decisions and satisfied the specific claims asserted by individuals
or groups who brought the complaint but without demanding any structural
change in public policies or in the existing administrative dynamics. Within
the framework of this second scheme, the Supreme Court is often very
careful to underscore the singularity of the facts and circumstances of the
case in order to prevent the decision from being only too readily relied upon
and applied by other courts.109

106
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
12/3/2002, “Ramos v. Buenos Aires,” (2002-325-396) (Arg.), the Supreme Court denied a
petition for a food subsidy and a housing solution filed by a woman with eight children and in
a state of extreme poverty. The Court ruled that the “amparo” expedited procedure was
inappropriate, lack of proof, and that the primary obligation for food and housing support
relies on the family, not the state. In addition, the Court said that these types of claims should
be heard by local jurisdictions, and not federal courts.
107
In “Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich,” CSJN, Fallos (1992-315-1492), the Supreme Court ruled
that human rights enshrined in international instruments are legally binding and should be
presumed operative and directly enforceable, even without legislation at the national level.
However, in “Quisberth Castro,” CSJN, Fallos (2012-335-452), a case dealing with the right
to adequate housing, the Supreme Court ruled that some rights have only “derivative”
enforceability, meaning that is necessary to pass legislation at the national level before a claim
could be filed in court.
108
United Nations International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2,
993 U.N.T.S. 3, Dec. 16, 1966.
109
A good example of this strategy is “Quisberth Castro,” CSJN, Fallos (2012-335-452). In
this case, the Supreme Court decided a case concerning the right to adequate housing in the
City of Buenos Aires. Here, the Court avoided a general ruling on the constitutionality of the
city’s housing policy and, instead, decided the case on purely individual grounds, considering
plaintiff’s special situation of extreme vulnerability.
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In other cases, the Supreme Court has expressly stated that it will not
regard a certain judgment as a precedent applicable to other pending
issues.110
In this scenario, it is usually the case that any benefit that the Supreme
Court decides to accord does not typically consist of one created by the Court
itself. Rather, the Supreme Court will act to restore existing benefits, which
the political branches of government have previously regulated and are
contemplated in the appropriate budget but which, for some reason, have
been arbitrarily suspended or removed.111
Finally, a third institutional alternative available to the courts is to
undertake the reform of existing public policies to remedy the underlying
structural failures that account for a repeated violation of certain rights. In
adopting this standpoint, which is truly innovative, the Argentine Supreme
Court has taken two different approaches.
The first entails the use of what are known as exhortatory judgments.
Here the Supreme Court rules a certain governmental omission
unconstitutional and urges the public authorities to pass the laws and
implement such policies to comply with constitutional mandates. A process
of institutional dialogue thus begins. The Judiciary confines itself to setting
the guidelines for future action by the political authorities112 and awaits the
initiative of the other branches of government.
The second approach, adopted by the Supreme Court in recent years,
entails the most heightened, activist-driven form of intervention and consists
110

Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
26/11/2007, “Badaro v. ANSES,” (2007-330-4866) (Arg.). In this case, the Supreme Court
expressly ruled that the decision would only apply to the particular case, and not to others in a
similar situation.
111
This situation is frequent in cases dealing with the right to health. In Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], “Asociación
Benghalensis,” (2000-323-1339) (Arg.), the Supreme Court ruled that the state should restore
treatment and provision of medicine for patients with HIV/AIDS. In Corte Suprema de
Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 24/10/2000, “Campodónico
de Beviacqua,”(2000-323-3229) (Arg.), the Supreme Court decided that the state should
restore benefits for patients with Kostman’s disease, and in “Asociación de Esclerosis
Múltiple de Salta,” CSJN, Fallos (2003-326-4931), the Court ruled that the state could not
legally interrupt ongoing treatments benefiting patients with multiple sclerosis.
112
An example of this position is Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National
Supreme Court of Justice], 8/8/2006, “Badaro v. ANSES,” (2006-329-3089) (Arg.). In this
case, the Supreme Court urged Congress to establish a mechanism for the automatic
adjustment of plaintiff’s social pension. In Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN]
[National Supreme Court of Justice], 23/5/2007 “Rosza,” (2007-330-2361) (Arg.), the
Supreme Court urged Congress to enact within a year a new valid regime for the appointment
of interim federal judges, setting guidelines that the new regulation should follow.
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of the use of structural remedies. Particularly noteworthy are the decisions
rendered in Verbitsky113 and Mendoza.114 These are two cases in which the
Supreme Court attempted a far-reaching structural reform model with a
managerial flavor, in an effort to reshape the dynamics underlying the
violation of fundamental rights. In both cases, the Supreme Court explicitly
invoked the experience in the United States to justify the introduction of
judgment enforcement mechanisms allowing it to formulate and monitor
plans for management and reform of the bureaucratic system held
responsible for the constitutional breach.
C. Prison Reform: Verbitsky
Verbitsky is the first case in which the Supreme Court of Argentina
attempted the adoption of structural remedies, expressly citing the experience
in the United States in this field.115 The case began when Horacio Verbitsky,
a public figure with close links to the federal government,116 and
representative of the NGO Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS),
brought a corrective and collective habeas corpus action before the Court of
Cassation of the Province of Buenos Aires. He invoked the defense of all
persons deprived of their freedom in the Province of Buenos Aires, detained
in police stations or overcrowded penal facilities.
As regards the merits of the case, the existence of an overloaded prison
system in the Province of Buenos Aires was successfully established. CELS
provided evidence of cases of overcrowding, promiscuity among inmates,
lack of special facilities for minors, and cells in dreadful sanitary and health
conditions.
As explained by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the decision was
made to review the case as “a structural case or structural reform lawsuit, in
the language used in Anglo-Saxon legal literature, owing to its complexity
and size.”117 In 2005 the Supreme Court ruled against the Province of
Buenos Aires and imposed a number of enforcement measures aimed at
113

Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
“Verbitsky, Horacio / Habeas Corpus,” (2005-328-1146) (Arg.).
114
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN], [National Supreme Court of Justice],
20/3/2007, “Mendoza, Beatriz v. Estado Nacional,” (2007-330-1158) (Arg.).
115
In Verbitsky, the Supreme Court of Argentina cites U.S. cases such as Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678 (1978), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and the work of LYNN S.
BRANHAM, THE LAW OF SENTENCING, CORRECTIONS, AND PRISONERS’ RIGHTS (2002).
116
Cf. Hipoteca Invisible, La Nación (Arg.) (Sept. 15, 2013).
117
RICARDO L. LORENZETTI, JUSTICIA COLECTIVA 47 (2010).
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modifying the then-existing prison conditions. Among such measures, it was
ordered that the Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos Aires, acting
through the competent lower courts, have the detention of minors and sick
persons in police stations within the province brought to an end within a
period of sixty days. Provincial courts were likewise directed to put an end
to any worsening of detention conditions entailing cruel, inhumane, or
degrading treatment. The Executive and the Legislature of the province were
also urged to bring the province’s legislation into line with the “United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners” adopted
by Law No. 24660.118 The Supreme Court required that these basic
guidelines should govern any detention or deprivation of freedom.
Most innovative in this case was the establishment of a methodology
based on institutional dialogue and negotiation. An upside of the decision
was the order directed to the Province of Buenos Aires to set up a “Dialogue
Table” together with certain leading NGOs, with the attendant duty to report
every sixty days on the progress made.119 The agenda was quite open, to the
extent that the judgment did not provide any detailed guidelines on key
matters such as the specific characteristics of prison infrastructure or the
definition of budgetary goals.
Regarding compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision and its actual
impact over time, there have been mixed results and varying degrees of
consistency in meeting each of the points addressed in it. As far as the
exhortation to reform the provincial legislation is concerned, it received
strong political support and an immediate response from the provincial
Legislature. For example, provincial Law No. 13449120 was passed in 2006,
introducing substantial amendments in the province’s Code of Criminal
Procedure in the area of pretrial detention and release from custody. Many
other sets of provisions have since been enacted in this regard. Scholars
specializing in this field note that the international guidelines cited by the
Supreme Court merely state that pretrial detention should be “exceptional,”
which is not a clear enough standard to guide reform.121 This explains why
the rules enacted are not thoroughly appropriate and have encountered
criticism.122 Witnessing to this lack of satisfactory results is the fact that the
118

Law No. 24,660, July 16, 1996, [28436] B.O. 2 (Arg.).
Corte Suprema de Justicia de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice], “Verbitsky, Horacio / Habeas Corpus,” (2005-328-1146) (Arg.).
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Law No. 13449, Prov. of Buenos Aires, Mar. 14, 2006, [LXVI-B] A.D.L.A. 1804.
121
Néstor P. Sagüés, Las Sentencias Constitucionales Exhortativas (“Apelativas” o “Con
Aviso”) y su Recepción en Argentina, L.L. (2005-F-1461, 1465-68).
122
See Néstor P. Sagüés, Las Sentencias Constitutionales Exhortativas, 4 ESTUDIOS
CONSTITUTIONALES 189 (2006).
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total number of pretrial detainees in the Province of Buenos Aires only
dropped slightly throughout the process, from 24,576 in 2005 to 19,605 in
2014.123 After nine years of litigation, the percentage of pretrial detainees
over the total amount of inmates is still above 60% without any significant
change over the past four years.124
Another fact that shows a lack of results in this area is that the total
number of inmates in the Province of Buenos Aires rose 33.2% from 2007 to
2014. As of 2014, this figure is at its peak over the last fifteen years,125 and
has led to a scenario in which twenty-nine of the fifty-six prison facilities are
filled beyond capacity126 with no serious infrastructure improvement under
way.127
As for the Supreme Court’s orders directed to eradicating the detention of
minors and sick persons in police stations, the results are ambivalent. On the
one hand, the province’s Supreme Court itself held, based on a report from
the Provincial “Memory Commission,” that these types of detentions had
been eradicated and were forbidden in the future, so it deemed the problem
to be formally solved.128 However, there are claims that this kind of illegal
detention still occurs in the so-called “Transitory Centers,”129 which would
not suit the needs of minors. Moreover, this aspect of the decision has given
rise to paradoxical, undesired effects, as there have been minors who have
filed habeas corpus petitions requesting to be kept in overcrowded cells at
police stations to avoid being transferred to facilities distant from their usual
place of residence.130
In connection with the number of adult detainees in police stations, CELS
reported that efforts to decrease it were successful at first: the number
dropped from 6,055 in 2004, to 2,782 in 2007.131 Nevertheless, limited
engagement on the part of the province’s public authorities to correct the
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situation once and for all led to a marked reversal of this downward trend. In
2009 the number climbed to 4,552 detainees.132 It has been claimed that this
drop in police station detentions is artificial and has been achieved at the
expense of worsening overall prison conditions.133
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court itself urged the governor of the
Province of Buenos Aires to remedy the situation, but the problem persisted.
Although the official number declined to approximately 1,069 in 2011,134 a
recent report published by CELS has shown that by 2014 the real figure was
above 3,000.135 The cause of this major setback is explained because in May
2014 the governor launched a crime prevention plan in which long-term
detentions in police stations were once again authorized,136 openly defying
the Supreme Court ruling. This plan has been legally challenged, but until
now these suits were dismissed.137
As regards this last issue, linked to overall detention conditions, it has
been noted that the most serious plight is not the deficit in cells or beds but
the fact that violence continues to be part and parcel of the structure and
culture of the prison system,138 and has grown considerably in recent
years.139 Riots among inmates are a common occurrence, exacerbated by
deplorable living conditions. This triggers episodes of harsh repression
leading, in turn, to increased friction and new outbreaks of violence.
Finally, reference should be made to the purely procedural side of
Verbitsky, namely the establishment of a “Dialogue Table” involving
provincial authorities and NGOs. While dialogue was intense during the first
two years after the judgment was issued, it then came to a complete
standstill. A recurrent problem was the lack of representation of the various
government agencies with jurisdiction in the area, which barred any
substantial headway in planning.140 Beginning in 2007, claims were made
that the new provincial authorities hindered the operation of this mechanism,
thus neutralizing its effectiveness.141
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It should be borne in mind that the figures in this field are manipulated by
government agencies, such that they are scarcely reliable as the basis for a
conclusive opinion on the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision. There
seems to be consensus that it had a moderately positive impact in the first
years, but the initiative then lost political support and the situation became
one of stalemate and clear retrogression on certain issues.
This failure may be due to the low level of commitment of the provincial
authorities. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Argentina did not
remand its decision to the Supreme Court of the Province of Buenos Aires,
which, to some extent, may explain the lack of engagement on the part of
local political and judicial authorities to tackle the task of formulating longterm solutions. The Supreme Court of Argentina has thus called for “active
involvement of the provincial Judiciary in matters that are vital to the
enforcement of the remedy, but has done without the involvement of the
provincial courts in the definition of the problem.”142 It is also notable that
the Supreme Court’s decision did not impose any specific sanctions for
noncompliance with or failure to abide by the demands made therein.
In summary, scholars have highlighted in recent years the difficulties
inherent in standing by the decision in Verbitsky. In 2009, it was asserted
that the minimum objective “is still far from achievement,”143 as CELS itself
then denounced that “excessive population density and overcrowding
continue to loom large at detention centers in the province” and that “the
current scenario is one of clear retrogression vis-à-vis the progress attained
during the two years immediately following the ruling in Verbitsky.”144 As
political support for this initiative on the part of the province’s authorities
dwindled after 2009, it is not surprising to hear that the situation of detainees
has not improved in practice, let alone substantially, nor is it possible to say
that minors are currently held in appropriate facilities.145 It follows that nine
years after the Supreme Court’s decision, the perception among both public
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opinion and experts is that the ruling “continues to be difficult, if not
impossible, to comply with.”146
D. The Environment: Mendoza
Mendoza is a case deriving from a claim filed by seventeen persons due
to environmental contamination at the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. In the
complaint, the plaintiffs sought monetary compensation, an end to pollution,
and environmental remediation. In so doing, they claimed that the federal
government, the Province of Buenos Aires, and the City of Buenos Aires
should be held liable. At the same time, they filed suit against forty-four
polluting companies for discharging hazardous waste directly into the river
without having built any treatment plants. It should be recalled that close to
5,000,000 people live in the basin of this river, one of the most heavily
polluted worldwide.
The lawsuit was not commenced as a class action but as an ordinary civil
proceeding under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Argentina. The Supreme Court issued a first judgment on June 20, 2006
holding that a distinction should be made between individual and collective
interests.147 The action for damages sustained by each individual was to be
pursued following the ordinary procedural steps before the lower courts. At
the same time, the Supreme Court ruled itself competent to hear the claim
regarding the collective interest, aimed at the remediation of the riverbed and
the prevention of future damage.148
A proceeding characterized as an “expedited environmental proceeding
without specific legal regulation”149 thus commenced, sparking great interest
among the public. Requests for information and public hearings then
followed, through which the parties involved regularly briefed the Supreme
Court.
Throughout 2006, the Supreme Court focused on determining who would
be the parties to the action, as there were no distinct pre-established criteria
for these types of cases. The decisions rendered in this regard spurred action
by Congress, and at the end of 2006, it passed Law No. 26168.150 The result
was the creation of the Matanza-Riachuelo Basin Authority (Autoridad de la
146
Víctor Bazán, La Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación y Algunas Líneas
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Cuenca Matanza-Riachuelo) (ACUMAR) as an interjurisdictional body
governed by public law.
Following a special reporting procedure and several other public hearings,
the Supreme Court passed judgment on July 8, 2008.151 What is especially
worth noting is that it was forward-looking in its vision, defining general
objectives as well as “the guidelines that the Basin Authority is to follow
regarding public reporting requirements, contamination originating from
industrial activities, remediation of waste dumps, cleanup of river banks,
expansion of the drinking water network, rainwater drain systems, sewerage,
and emergency sanitation plan.”152
In short, this decision ordered the Federal Government, the Province of
Buenos Aires, and the City of Buenos Aires to comply with a mandatory
program called Comprehensive Environmental Remediation Plan (Plan
Integral de Saneamiento Ambiental) (PISA) for the Matanza-Riachuelo
Basin. The public agency responsible for compliance with PISA is
ACUMAR, chaired by Argentina’s Secretary for the Environment and
Sustainable Development and also made up of representatives of the three
jurisdictions held responsible.
In this same ruling, the Supreme Court made a decision not covered by
any legal provisions and otherwise unprecedented, whereby it delegated the
judgment enforcement procedure to a federal trial court in the city of
Quilmes.153 For the purposes of such enforcement task, the Supreme Court
vested this lower court with exclusive jurisdiction of all matters associated
with compliance with the judgment for relief and all cases relating to
collective environmental damage in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin. The
lower court was also to act as a reviewing court in respect of all
administrative acts issuing from ACUMAR. All decisions made by the
federal court in the exercise of the delegation of authority received may be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.154
Additionally, the decision granted powers to the enforcement court to
direct the investigation of crimes deriving from noncompliance with the
orders made in the decision and to apply and set the amount of fines for
failure to fulfill the obligations spelled out in it.
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The ruling also noted that failure to adhere to any of the deadlines set out
in the program would result in the accrual of a daily fine to be enforced by
the chair of ACUMAR. The Supreme Court also entrusted the Office of the
Federal Ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo) and certain NGOs (Asociación
Ciudadana por los Derechos Humanos [ACDH], Asociación de Vecinos de
La Boca [AVLB], CELS, Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales
[FARN] and Greenpeace) with the formation of a collective body charged
with monitoring PISA, as well as with representing the public interest within
the process of enforcement of the judgment and fostering citizen
involvement.155 In reference to the scope of the directives given by the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Lorenzetti explained that no detailed
procedures were established for the administrative authorities to follow.
Rather, the Supreme Court limited itself to setting “objectives, including a
description of stages according to the various sources of contamination and
the timelines to be met.”156
On the basis of this particular institutional structure, framed specially to
accommodate this process, work got underway. But one year after the
Supreme Court’s decision was passed, critics began pointing to instances of
noncompliance with the plan and non-observance of the timelines.157 Two
years after its ruling, the Supreme Court issued a harsh decision admitting
that “two years having passed since such ruling, and despite continuous
demands from the judge vested with delegated authority, there is evidence of
instances of noncompliance for which no sufficient justification has been
provided”158 and threatened to impose fines on the officers involved.
More than eight years after the beginning of the proceedings, it can be
asserted that Mendoza managed to seize the public attention. The Supreme
Court’s initiative, coupled with the initial political support of the federal
government, enabled the adoption of measures that only entail, however,
isolated instances of progress. Among the identified problems, especially
serious is the difficulty in coordinating multijurisdictional action. ACUMAR
is made up of three states aligned with different political parties that are at
loggerheads with each other. In addition, the economic interests of the
riverside companies have been brought to bear on the plan.
155
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The official data, which ACUMAR submitted to the Supreme Court in
2013,159 shows that headway has been made in eradicating contaminating
industries in the Dock Sud area; 69% of open-air waste dumps have likewise
been eradicated, and various waste treatment measures have been adopted in
fourteen municipalities; the towpath has been cleared, and some 1,059
families have been relocated; numerous measures have been implemented to
provide medical care to those affected by environmental hazards; and
campaigns have been launched for ongoing monitoring of water and air
quality at various spots within the basin.
Nonetheless, other reliable, independent sources claim that the advances
are not as significant as maintained by ACUMAR, as the means employed to
resolve some of the conflicts underlying the issue are insufficient in
proportion to existing risks and the damage suffered by both the inhabitants
and the environment. A report prepared by the General Auditing Office of
the Nation (Auditoría General de la Nación) (AGN) shows under-executions
of the budget’s appropriations and that the results submitted by ACUMAR
have been particularly unclear, which impedes an objective assessment of
any headway made in the relevant areas.160
For example, according to official figures, there are 12,701 production
facilities on the banks of the river, of which 6,949 are industrial facilities and
a mere 177 have completed the Industrial Reconversion Program.161 This
suggests that the pace of progress is inadequate.162
In the case of open-air waste dumps, a major regression has occurred.
Internal audit units of ACUMAR concluded in an undisclosed report that in
eleven municipalities almost 70% of the waste dumps that were previously
closed, reappeared within a year.163 In addition, the report reveals a complete
lack of surveillance and that waste containers were placed in only 3% of
these locations. According to the press, this situation is attributable to the
lack of engagement of local authorities.164
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With regard to family relocations, one leading NGO, Fundación
Ambiente y Recursos Naturales (FARN), has argued that despite the progress
claimed by the authorities, quality of life has not improved substantially, in
view of the poor basic living conditions in the new homes.165 In agreement
with this evaluation, the Federal Ombudsman has also raised the issue and
denounced a lack of concern for the rights of relocated persons.166
As for the Remediation Plan, the policies put into effect have also been
the object of bitter criticism owing to the absence of a proactive approach to
health care issues and a lack of preventive intervention. Among other things,
this explains the claims that there is still a large number of children with
harmful lead content in their blood.167
Specifically in connection with water quality, Greenpeace has shown that
there are no tangible improvements or a measurable trend toward better
quality of surface waters, which continue to be severely contaminated.168
They still exhibit high levels of heavy metals like lead and chromium and of
organic matter, while oxygen levels have declined to nil, all of which helps
to cause a deleterious impact. An independent study published in 2013
found that 80% of water samples taken from wells near the MatanzaRiachuelo river basin were not safe for drinking due to contamination.169
Overall, there are no stable, comprehensive policies targeting the
substantive issues that lie at the core of this environmental degradation such
that any partial advances may become permanent. Clearly, there are no
adequate controls over the disposal of industrial waste into the river, which is
the primary reason why it continues to be contaminated. In recent years, the
problem has been compounded by a lack of political engagement, which is
only corroborated by the serious difficulty observed from the very beginning
in ensuring the availability of funds for the required tasks.170
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Responsibility for the day-to-day execution of these plans fell with a
lower court in Quilmes, supported with vast resources, personnel, and
substantial decision-making power. An ad hoc procedure, not otherwise
contemplated by law, was implemented which included the power not only
to impose fines but also to order temporary arrests. But as was to be
expected, the AGN verified the existence of irregularities and a lack of
transparency in several remediation projects. The large amount of power
concentrated in the judge, unrestrained by the absence of a clear-cut legal
framework, led to abuses and claims of corruption, which ultimately
prompted the Supreme Court to remove the judge from his position and to
file criminal charges against him.171 The outcome has been that the Mendoza
case is now at a complete deadlock.
Consequently, it may be asserted that the remediation efforts undertaken
by the Judiciary have so far achieved some progress in certain specific areas
and have otherwise succeeded in placing the issue on the public agenda. But
as far as measurable results are concerned, the expectations among experts as
well as the public have not been satisfied, as shown by the aforementioned
reports, the press,172 the University of Buenos Aires,173 and legal scholars.174
IV. LESSONS FROM THE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
A number of lessons may be drawn from the Public Law Litigation
experience in the United States and in Argentina. In this regard, it is possible
to identify a set of principles that make up a model that may prove useful to
analyze legal frameworks and practices in both countries. The comparative
analysis will show if these principles are complied with in each country and
to what extent they may be deemed as generally valid.
For the sake of clarity, it is necessary to distinguish those principles that
have a political connotation from those that are purely technical. The
political conditions listed below are descriptive rather than normative in
nature, and allow for an analysis of the role that the courts will need to
perform in their interaction with other power-holders. The discovery of
generally valid technical requirements carries a normative edge. They
encompass certain issues relating to the legal framework deemed
171
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indispensable for the decisions of the Judiciary to have a measurable impact
on reality.
A. Political Conditions
1. Coordination with the Political Branches
One of the most controversial claims of the leading U.S. scholars in this
field is that when it comes to the political conditions, no judicially driven
reform will have a significant and sustained impact without a consensus
among the public and the coordinated and collaborative action of the political
branches of government.175
The American experience shows us that it is not clear at all that the
Judiciary, acting alone, is able to exert a decisive influence on public opinion
regarding a specific issue or to overcome even localized resistance to change
in the operation of bureaucratic agencies. At the same time, it is possible to
observe that the activity of the courts is ineffective when coping with adverse
public opinion nationwide or with ongoing conflict between the political
departments of the federal government.
As discussed above, desegregation in the South yielded tangible results
upon the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which authorized the
federal government to cut off federal funds to school districts engaged in
racial discrimination.176 It was through joint action on the part of all three
branches of government that real change started to unfold. Judicial activity,
in and of itself, was no agent of change. As explained by Tushnet, only
when “faced with the prospect of losing access to federal funds, school
systems desegregated.”177
This political perspective sheds light on the true role that courts play in
reform movements. Courts are “quite important to these movements, but
175
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they are not the sole player, and often not even the most important player.”178
Where judicial action is not supported by the elective branches of the federal
government or in cases of stark opposition to stances firmly adopted by
interest groups, judicial action “is usually unsuccessful, and any court
decisions in one’s favor are likely to meet with considerable popular
resistance,”179 such that they prove ineffectual.180 This is not only to the
detriment of the affected groups, whose desire for change will remain
unfulfilled, but it also jeopardizes the authority and prestige of the Judiciary.
It follows that in matters of structural reform, judicial activity must, to the
extent possible, be implemented strategically, encouraging power-holders to
cooperate in a sustained fashion over time.181 The support and cooperation
of administrators in middle levels of bureaucracies is especially meaningful
for judicial activity to be fruitful, as it is primarily the officers in such levels
that are likely to be affected by reforms. When judicial action succeeds, it
provides cover or a tool for leverage in the relationship of a bureaucracy with
the legislative and the executive branches, or when “administrators and staff
are willingly involved in negotiation, change can occur.”182
The experience in Argentina seems to confirm these controversial
insights. The cases selected by the Supreme Court to undertake structural
reform have not met with opposition on the part of the other branches of
federal government or of majority public opinion. On the contrary, the initial
momentum gained in Verbitsky and Mendoza was in line with initiatives
advocated by the federal government and its allies. Then, when active
support from the elective branches waned, reforms came to a standstill and
even retrogression became apparent.
In Verbitsky, the nub of the case was the question of prison conditions,
and while not a priority issue among public opinion, it has not encountered
resistance. As for the posture taken by the political branches, recall that
Horacio Verbitsky, a journalist and chair of an NGO very close to the federal
government, commenced the case. However, once the initial stage was
completed, the case came to a standstill, as discussed above. This was
178
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particularly noticeable following changes in the provincial government and
the election of Daniel Scioli. Scioli is a governor from the same political
party as the federal government, but from a different faction than the one led
by Verbitsky. It is thus patent that results were obtained when coordinated
action existed between the Supreme Court, the federal government, and the
provincial government. When this alignment wore thin, the Province of
Buenos Aires withdrew its support, the case reached a stalemate, and some
of the results achieved were reversed.
The environmental issues in the Matanza-Riachuelo river basin that gave
rise to Mendoza had been a matter of concern among various political parties
in the national political arena—or so they had seemed to be in their political
talk. In subsequent years, the issue continued to raise concern among
political parties and public opinion; promises were reiterated but no results
were ever in sight. During the Néstor Kirchner Administration and the first
years of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s presidency, the environmental
question was given a boost by the Executive, in parallel with the decision in
Mendoza. In tackling the issue, the Supreme Court used arguments similar
to those deployed by the federal government, and in deciding the case, it held
several districts and private players liable. Within this context, Congress
expressly endorsed the initiative by passing Law No. 26168, whereby
ACUMAR was created. In the enforcement stage, the Supreme Court
remained aligned with the federal government, as evidenced by the fact that
the remediation tasks were delegated to the federal court of Quilmes, a
district politically close to the Executive.
But like in Verbitsky, the support of the political authorities in executing
the plans gradually eroded. Aware of the lack of commitment and
inefficiency of some of the agencies and local authorities who had the duty to
comply with the remediation plan, the Supreme Court urged those involved
into action, but was met with a tepid response, if at all.183 What we have
today is an issue that was removed from the political parties’ platforms and a
judicial case caught in a quagmire amid corruption scandals.
Thus, the Argentine experience shows that the Supreme Court has not put
structural remedies at odds with the agenda of the political branches of
government or of public opinion. Rather, evidence suggests that in these
cases, the Supreme Court initially acted in accord with the central
government and that the judicial proceedings lagged behind precisely
because, among other reasons, political support eroded over time and
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2. Authority of the Judiciary
As pointed out in the preceding section, the support for reform processes
from public opinion and the political branches of government is usually
inconsistent. To ensure the continuity of reforms, the Judiciary would have
to assert its force at some critical instances. In this regard, the experience in
the United States shows that in the cases in which structural remedies had a
sustained impact over time, it was crucial for the Judiciary to have enough
authority to empower the judges to undertake the administration of resources
before they got into the hands of traditional political players. What is more,
along with the need for legal instruments of coercion to operate as an
assurance that the judicial decision will be complied with in a timely manner,
there is the need for the political system to be mature enough to regard any
act of disobedience of a court order as intolerable.
This notion, which looks elementary enough, is most often taken for
granted or otherwise not analyzed in depth by legal scholars. It is
nonetheless the key concept on which the system of judicial structural reform
pivots in the United States. Chayes was among the first to note this,
indicating that judges in the United States could carry out these functions
effectively “only by drawing on the legitimacy and moral force that courts
have developed through the performance of their inherent function,
adjudication according to the traditional conception.”184 This means that,
unlike the situation in other countries, the experience in the United States is
largely accounted for by the “independence and prestige of the federal
judiciary.”185 It is within a system having these characteristics, in which the
courts have earned for themselves a significant position of power and
legitimacy, that they have managed to use their authority to propel social
change.
The school desegregation and prison reform cases in the United States
demonstrate that the starting point for activation of the structural reform
system has been the strong affirmation of judicial authority. In the case of
schools, lower court judges in the southern states had a difficult task in the
beginning, since they could only rely on the nominal support of the highest
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court in the land.186 In these circumstances, it was necessary for the Supreme
Court to make full use of its authority and legitimacy to overcome resistance
from the political system and to explicitly endorse the reform process. Fiss
underscores this aspect of the process, saying that, “[a]t critical junctures—
Cooper v. Aaron, the faculty desegregation cases of the mid-1960[s], and
Green v. County School Board—the Warren Court stepped in,”187 thus
preventing judicial efforts from coming to nothing.
Once the judiciary has asserted its authority within the political system,
the means required to ensure compliance with its decisions must be firmly
established, either via statutory instruments or case law. In the American
system, the key components of this structure include the prerogative of the
courts to penalize officials with fines or criminal sanctions for contempt188 in
cases where “the wrongdoing largely consists of disobedience of judicial
orders.”189 Thus, the most “prominent feature of structural injunctions is that
the district court judge has very broad power to issue orders, to revise them
as he or she sees fit, and to enforce them by threatening to hold violators in
contempt of court.”190
Only when the judiciary can carve out its distinct share of power vis-à-vis
the other branches of government, and the technical means are in place to
effectively penalize officials that do not abide by court orders, can a
structural reform process begin to be regarded as feasible.
This conclusion applies both to a strongly unilateral model, in which the
judge designs and enforces a mandatory specific remedy, despite steadfast
opposition from the defendant authority, and to modern multilateral or
experimentalist models, in which the judge provides a forum for stakeholders
to negotiate and devise a solution that will eventually be included in a
voluntary settlement or consent decree. Voluntary settlements or consent
decrees may thus be negotiated by the parties, but they are conceived as a
“written set of duties and deadlines with intermediate milestones, all backed
up by the court’s power to hold the defendants in contempt.”191 Moreover,
the authority of the court is needed not only as an assurance of the
186

See Klarman, supra note 19, at 216; JACK W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN:
SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION (1961).
187
Fiss, supra note 5, at 1.
188
Melnick, supra note 90, at 20.
189
Fiss, supra note 5, at 24.
190
Melnick, supra note 90, at 25, 55; accord Michael J. Klarman, The White Primary
Rulings: A Case Study in the Consequences of Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 29 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 55 (2001) (arguing that the relative availability of sanctions is an important factor in
determining whether particular constitutional rights are implemented).
191
SANDLER & SCHOENBROD, supra note 66, at 63.

488

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:451

commitments assumed, but also as the bedrock of the negotiation process.
Advocates of multilateral models draw on this premise in devising solutions
for structural reform. In this regard, Strum cautions that “the deliberative
model does not assume or require that consensus be reached. The model
provides the backstop of a judicially-imposed remedy in the event the
participants are unable to reach agreement.”192
Charles Sabel and William Simon propose a form of intervention in
which the judiciary becomes an appropriate forum for the destabilization of
power structures that operate as a barrier to change, rather than as a source of
solutions. These authors suggest that the terms of decrees have altered over
time, becoming more “flexible and provisional,” and more focused on
“procedures for ongoing stakeholder participation and measured
accountability.”193 But even in these developed, flexible, experimentalist
models, stakeholders can rely on the vital feature of the authority of the
court, which does not serve merely as a “power broker” or forum for the
discussion of remedies but rather provides the implicit and yet distinct
possibility of decisive background intervention.
“These background
sanctions function as a kind of ‘penalty default’—a result that no one is
likely to prefer, intended to induce the parties to negotiate a better one.”194
In Argentina, these critical conditions for judicially-driven reform are not
fully satisfied. The Supreme Court has resorted to high-profile structural
reform cases in an effort to gain the legitimacy and political power it had not
previously achieved. The judiciary in Argentina does not have the prestige,
tradition, or the institutional strength of its counterpart in the United States.
During the twentieth century, Argentina, like most other Latin American
countries, has fallen prey to coups, military regimes, and authoritarian
democratic governments that have gradually eroded the independence and
legitimacy of the judiciary.195 Even in times of democratic rule, the
incumbents have managed to unseat Supreme Court members and to appoint
judges of their own political complexion in their stead. Since 1983,
Argentina has succeeded in cementing stable democratic rule, but the
Supreme Court still has undergone reshuffling to the detriment of its
authority. The number of Supreme Court justices was increased in 1990 and
some of its members were impeached in 2002, 2003, and 2005.
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As for the availability of technical instruments for enforcement,
Argentina, like the United States, has mechanisms in place whereby criminal
liability for contempt may be attached to those who willfully disregard
judicial orders.196 Nevertheless, trial judges in the U.S. have more extensive
power to declare someone in contempt than judges in civil law systems. In
Argentina, a court with criminal jurisdiction must prove the offender guilty
in a special procedure before being punished. Therefore, government
officials do not perceive criminal sanctions as a real threat. This has become
patent in notorious cases of recent years, in which the orders of the Supreme
Court have been met with blatant disobedience without any visible judicial or
political consequences.197
With regard to pecuniary penalties imposed on noncompliant officials
personally, the traditional view was that they were a tool to coerce
compliance with court-ordered measures.198 This approach has now been
countered by Article 9 of the recently enacted Law No. 26854,199 which
provides that courts may not impose pecuniary penalties on government
officials personally. Although this provision will probably be challenged as
unconstitutional, it does lay bare the low-level commitment of the political
branches when it comes to respect for the authority of the courts.
In summary, this basic political condition is far from being fulfilled in
Argentina. The strategy of using structural remedies in aid of legitimization
has helped the Supreme Court position itself more favorably in the eyes of
the public, but has so far failed as a tool for decided assertion of its authority.
Further, this deficiency is yet another reason that explains the discrete impact
of judicial mandates over time, and specifically appears as a large obstacle to
the successful implementation of structural remedies, whether in a unilateral
or in a multilateral model.
3. Checks on the Judiciary
Since structural remedies began to be used in the United States, scholars
have noted that one major challenge would be how to establish a pattern of
adequate control over the activity of the courts. Once the department that is
196
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constitutionally called upon to check on the political branches of government
started to discharge managerial functions, the question arose as to which
body would be fit to supervise the Judiciary. This is a pertinent issue to raise
from a theoretical standpoint, within a broader reading that calls into
question the democratic legitimacy of a non-elected body that becomes a
manager of public resources, as well as from a purely practical standpoint,
with a view to averting instances of abuse of power or corruption.
Clearly, to the extent that reform processes are postulated within the
framework of legal discourse, it is institutionally difficult to implement some
form of control by bodies outside of the Judiciary itself.200 Even so, it is
crucial to introduce mechanisms capable of cabining the discretionary
exercise of this new judicial function, as there is otherwise the risk that
instances of abuse will undermine the legitimacy of both the judicial process
and the background substantive claim, thus leading to typical cases of
“judicial populism.”201 The early studies by Fiss already showed that
American legal writers underlined that structural reform processes pose a
political threat to the ideal of judicial independence, because “[t]he desire to
be efficacious leads the judge to attempt the remarkable feat of
reconstructing a state bureaucracy . . . and that ambition in turn forces the
judge to abandon his position of independence and to enter the world of
politics.”202
In the United States, the courts themselves have brought to light cases of
corruption or collusion with the judge or between the parties. A strikingly
illustrative example of this is Justice Lewis Powell’s accusation that parties
in a desegregation case had “joined forces apparently for the purpose of
extracting funds from the state treasury.”203
While claims of corruption or abuse of authority on the part of judges in
the United States did exist, they were discrete if compared to the number of
cases in which structural remedies were used. Therefore, it appears that in
the United States the managerial role of the judge is not monitored by any
formal body; rather, it suffices to have recourse in the general legal
framework and in monitoring by the stakeholders involved.
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In countries like Argentina, the danger of abuse of power and corruption
on the part of judges within the context of structural reform cases is
potentially more acute. According to an international ranking compiled by
Transparency International, Argentina ranks as low as 102nd among 176
countries.204 Argentina also registers high levels of undue influence (140th),
along with one of the lowest ratings in terms of trust in politicians (143rd),
coupled with a very negative assessment of the institutional set-up (138th)
according to a 2012–2013 report by the World Economic Forum.205 In
particular, the institutions perceived as being the most corrupt in Argentina
are political parties, government officials, Legislatures, the police, and also
the Judiciary.206
Specifically in connection with structural reform cases, the issue of
corruption came dramatically onto the scene. The federal judge responsible
for enforcement in Mendoza, was summoned to step aside amid serious
allegations of corruption and abuse of authority, which resulted in criminal
charges being pressed even by the Supreme Court. In removing him, the
Supreme Court expressly stated that, as the case involved structural reform,
he was to maximize caution in order to preserve “the confidence of society in
the transparency of the procedures carried out.”207 Consequently, since
November 2012, the Mendoza case, undeniably the most representative case
championed by the Supreme Court in the structural reform scenario, “has
been virtually at a standstill.”208
In view of the different sociological and institutional contexts, it is thus
plain that countries like Argentina are not readily prepared to count on the
same control model as that in the United States. The existence of higher
corruption levels and of a weak legal and institutional frameworks to combat
lack of transparency issues requires the implementation of tailor-made,
innovative solutions. It is necessary to provide for independent oversight of
the actions of judges who become managers of sizeable amounts of public
resources. Among other alternatives, it is reasonable to induce a more
prominent role to be played by institutions formally outside the Judiciary,
204
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such as the AGN or the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation
(“Ministerio Público Fiscal”) (MPF), as is the case in Brazil.209
B. Technical Requirements
1. Legal Regulation of Class Actions
A distinctive feature of structural reform processes is that they are
collective in scope since they do not center on an individual but on a
“group.”210 This premise calls for a redefinition of the traditional notion of
“party,” as the claimant appearing before the court does not exercise an
individual and exclusive right, but rather asserts a right accruing to an
indefinite number of people. Clear-cut rules of procedure must thus be laid
down whereby the court can determine “whether the interests of the victim
group are adequately represented”211 as well as ensure that the basic
requirements of due process and the right to a defense in court will be
adhered to.
As noted before, the procedural avenue available in the United States for
the filing of the most successful cases concerning school desegregation and
prison reform has been that of class actions, especially those litigated under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as amended in 1966.212 That year, a
new system was mapped out to ensure that class members would be
identified before the issuance of a final decision in the litigation and that they
would be bound by it, except for special cases. Additionally, the 1966
“amendments introduced a more transactional approach to litigation and
made the rules concerning party structure more flexible,”213 and were
specifically aimed at the improved implementation of structural reform
processes.214 At the core of this procedural device is certification of the
class. Among the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23215 is a general
provision covering the various areas in which this instrument may be helpful,
from civil rights suits to massive tort cases involving monetary claims.
In the case of Public Law Litigation, which engenders structural
remedies, the requirements that are usually satisfied for certification of a
209
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class are those under Rule 23(b)(2). Here, the decision on certification
results in a so-called “mandatory” class that does not provide class members
with a right to opt out of the class. As explained in the Advisory Committee
note to the 1966 amendment, Rule 23(b)(2) was adopted to enable the
prosecution of civil rights actions and it does not extend to cases in which the
appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to monetary
damages.216 Thus, in the context of civil rights litigation seeking declaratory
relief for violation of constitutional rights, Rule 23(b)(2) actions are
particularly appropriate.
The certification procedure is supplemented by techniques devised to
preserve the rights of the individual members of the class, such as “broad
notice of the suit and its processes, refusal to proceed until the original
parties procure the representation of specified interests, recruitment efforts
by special masters, and invitations to amici curiae.”217 Additionally, the law
provides guideposts for the judge to evaluate whether the party applying for
representative party status will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class. The court will assess whether such party can act in an informed
manner, diligently, and vigorously, and whether there is a possibility of
conflicting interests or a risk of collusion.218
Upon certifying the class, the court appoints a class counsel, who acquires
control of the proceedings. The court must also evaluate the ability of
counsel to represent the interests of the class in a balanced, appropriate
fashion, as well as consider the resources that counsel will commit to
representing the class. To inform the certification decision, “the judge may
conduct preliminary evidentiary hearings on the merits or the class issue,
appoint special masters, request amicus briefs, or permit intervention in order
to gather information.”219 In this regard, the clear statutory guidance
furnished by Rule 23(g) is vital to the proceeding; even so, there is a very
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real possibility that class lawyers will not adequately represent the interests
of their clients.220
Finally, one of the salient features of Rule 23 is the broad binding effect
of a class judgment on the parties involved in the dispute. Pursuant to
subdivision (c)(3), the judgment rendered in class actions contemplated in
subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall be
final and binding on all class members.221
As set forth above, the most highly developed and effective forms of
structural reform processes are handled through voluntary settlements or
consent decrees. The unambiguous, thorough regulation of the various
aspects of class actions and the class certification process under subdivision
(b)(2) makes these negotiated solutions considerably easier to achieve.
Sabel and Simon highlight that the focal point in the multilateral model of
structural litigation is that “the court must identify the affected people, assess
the representativeness of those who purport to speak for them, and
sometimes assign weights to the competing interests asserted in the
process.”222
In Argentina, there is no federal code or statute that provides for general,
comprehensive regulation of class, group or collective actions that may give
rise to structural reform. There are only laws containing specific provisions
in areas like habeas corpus, consumer rights, or environmental law. These
are scattered rules that only address some specific facets of collective
processes, for example by granting consumer or environmental associations
or certain public authorities broad standing to sue and by establishing basic
guidelines regarding the extended effects of res judicata.
In Verbitsky, for instance, the action was maintained according to the
procedure provided for in Law No. 23098 on habeas corpus.223 The habeas
corpus action, also provided for in Article 43 of the Argentine Constitution,
typically entails an expedited, simple, prompt relief proceeding directed to
restoring a person’s freedom or to remedying an aggravation of detention
conditions. But as the proceeding is expedited in nature, it leaves no room
for a class certification process, for broad participation of third parties or
amici curiae, or for expanded debate and proffering of evidence. The same
holds true of an “amparo” proceeding224: they are both exceptional devices
220
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but are only to be resorted to in cases of urgency, and in the event of patent
violations of constitutional rights. Thus, habeas corpus or amparo actions
are not suitable for multilateral litigation requiring devices to accommodate
the participation of various social sectors as well as rules for ample debate
and evidence.225
In Mendoza, the action was brought under the procedure regulated by the
General Environment Act No. 25675.226 As noted earlier, this law does not
offer exhaustive regulation of the collective process, but merely formulates a
broad standing-to-sue standard, authorizes the judge to apply procedural
rules more flexibly, and provides for extended effects of res judicata, subject
to certain limitations. The law contemplates no mechanism for certification
of a class that might be affected by environmental damage and gives no
guiding principles to assess the appropriate representation of the plaintiff.
As to the effects of the judgment, it provides that it will be final and binding
on third parties unrelated to the litigation, except where the case is lost on
account of evidentiary shortfalls. It should further be noted that the law
contains no special provisions governing possible settlements.
What these cases evince is that Public Law Litigation initiatives have
been undertaken without any apposite procedural regulation. The Supreme
Court attempted to fill this void in the Halabi case,227 in which it pointed to
the failure by Congress to regulate this vital aspect of collective claims and
expressly acknowledged the viability of a collective claim covering
homogeneous individual interests, provided certain requirements are met.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated in its decision that this device needed
regulation in a manner such that legal actions should have “characteristics
and effects analogous to those under the law of the United States.”228
However, this type of approach, whereby the courts purportedly seek to
fill a statutory gap, is particularly ineffective.229 Consistent with its nature as
a judgment, the Supreme Court’s decision limited itself to outlining some
elementary procedural issues, but failed to make provision for a myriad of
225
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aspects that are essential for a reasonable use of class actions and for the
proper implementation of a multilateral model of structural reform.
The absence of clear statutory regulation at the federal level is now
causing many practical problems. For example, this void is used as “an
excuse for the filing of generic and vague complaints that curtail the exercise
of one of the most significant constitutional safeguards, namely, none other
than the right to a defense in court and to due process of law.”230 Issues of
overlapping claims and jurisdiction likewise arise,231 which defendants often
exploit to delay litigation.
In any case, the most serious problem posed by the absence of
comprehensive and appropriate statutory regulation is the lack of incentives
to adopt a multilateral litigation model and to reach solutions in the form of a
settlement. This is an essential feature of the regulation scheme in the area
of Public Law Litigation, as may clearly be inferred from the experience in
the United States. Therefore, it is important to highlight that the question
does not revolve merely around filling a statutory gap, but rather around the
absolute need to adopt the model for statutory regulation of class actions that
best fits the dynamics of structural reform litigation.
In this connection, it is worth pointing out that legislative initiatives
regarding collective claims in Latin America do not follow the American
class actions model, but Brazil’s collective claims model and the “The IberoAmerican Collective Actions Model Code.” In Argentina, the few statutes in
force in this regard, such as the Consumer Protection Act232 or the General
Environment Act, as well as the majority of bills pending in Congress in this
area,233 are essentially patterned on the Brazilian model.
As regards Public Law Litigation specifically, the Brazilian model differs
from the regulation of class actions under Rule 23 as follows:
(i) it does not provide for a stage for class certification, as the
focus is only on the expansion of standing to sue;
(ii) individuals are in all cases given an opt-out right;
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(iii) there are no objective standards laid down by law for the
judge to pass on the adequacy of party representation or of
class counsel;234
(iv) the collective judgment, or the settlement reached,235 is
binding on all group members, but it is “vulnerable.”236 The
decision must not prejudice the individual rights of class
members, which may be asserted by using a separate individual
procedural avenue (secundum eventum litis), nor does it bar
relitigation of the issues when the collective complaint has
been dismissed for lack of evidence (secundum probationem).
The reasons that have historically led Latin American countries to adopt a
model having these differing features hinge on the idea that they have a poor
notification system, unfit to make society aware of the existence of a
collective claim, and that they lack a “culture” of collective processes as well
as a legal bar or NGOs prepared to fund the prosecution of any such claim.237
But these objections simply cannot stand today. The difficulties
associated with notification that were exposed more than thirty years ago
should now be deemed overcome. Most countries can rely on the deep
penetration of the media, internet, and mobile devices, even among the
neediest sectors of the population. Moreover, the record in Verbitsky and
Mendoza shows that countries like Argentina have developed a strong
culture of collective processes over the last decade, with a mushrooming of
NGOs now engaged in this type of activity.
It follows that in the current circumstances, those countries seeking to
embrace the most successful models of Public Law Litigation should pass
procedural legislation that would place the right incentives for negotiated
reforms. Specifically, the procedural rules that are to govern structural
reform cases should satisfy at least the following minimum requirements:
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(i) a process for class certification providing for the
appointment of a sole representative;
(ii) the possibility of certifying a mandatory class, without optout rights;
(iii) clear standards for the judge to evaluate, throughout the
proceedings, if party representation and class counsel are
adequate;
(iv) the judgment and the settlement reached should be final
and binding on all class members and definitively dispose of all
issues raised, without the possibility, in ordinary
circumstances, of instituting subsequent actions in connection
therewith.
These requirements, which have driven the successful cases of structural
reform in the United States, are key to the establishment of a class
representative equipped with strong bargaining power and capable of
offering both parties the possibility of a definitive solution that is immune
from subsequent challenge via collective or individual claims. It is otherwise
less probable that a multilateral model of structural reform can be
implemented with a focus on negotiation and on disposition of the issues by
means of settlements or consent decrees.
2. Agency Problems
As stated above, structural reform cases tend to place too much power in
the hands of class representatives. Thus the system clears the way for them
to abuse their position of control and strike collusive agreements to the
detriment of the wronged group, of some segment of that group, or of
government agencies. These agency problems emerged as one of the reasons
for strong prejudice in Latin American countries against the use of collective
claims.
A starting point to examine this issue lies in existing evidence that judges,
when faced with a consent decree, generally act with “a great deal of
timidity” and “are willing to let the parties, particularly the defendants,
control the process and outcome of these lawsuits.”238 In these cases, it is a
“controlling group”239 or “organizational leadership,”240 as it has come to be
238
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known, that usually imposes its will and drives the litigation, rather than “the
class members themselves.”241
At the same time, this anomaly can be readily identified as the political
front. Specialized authors have pointed out that the political branches of
government often resort to litigation to shirk their executive or legislative
responsibilities toward the citizens. It has thus been criticized that in
employing complex procedural devices, a court “allowed the use of its office
to give political cover to a governor who should have taken responsibility for
the decision on his own.”242
Within the context of prison reform in the United States, correctional and
law enforcement officers were usually collaborators in the litigation. The
remedies in these cases, “frequently designed at least in part by the
defendants themselves, very much served what at least some of those
defendants saw as their interests: increasing their budgets, controlling their
inmate populations, and encouraging the professionalization of their
workforces and the bureaucratization of their organizations.”243
In the field of educational reform, many authors have underscored the
state of risk and disadvantage experienced by “clients whose educational
interests may no longer accord with the integration ideals of their
attorneys.”244 Here, one can often see class counsel “making decisions,
setting priorities, and undertaking responsibilities that should be determined
by their clients and shaped by the community.”245
This turns the spotlight on the attorneys who act as representatives not
only of their direct clients (whether individuals or organizations) but also of
the class as a whole. In these scenarios, attorneys must act as “spokesmen for
large groupings toward which they had duties and responsibilities different
from those of the ordinary lawyer-client relationship,”246 which normally
worsens agency problems247 and prompts attorneys to “advance their vision
of the public interest, often at the expense of some of their clients.”248
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Several legal and institutional initiatives have been put forward to address
these agency problems. First among them has been the demand for greater
involvement of the judge in all phases of the lawsuit, especially in narrowing
the issues249 and subject to the duty to exercise close control over the content
of any settlements agreed upon.
A second point of concern involves potential conflicts of interest, which
make a strong case for expanding the participation of persons that might be
affected by the decision. As Appel explains, although broad intervention
may add time to the proceeding, “intervenors must intervene because the
parties representing their interests are inadequate” and “attorneys for their
interest are inept, inexperienced, overworked, underpaid, or all four.”250
Thus, there should be rules specifically devised to govern the activity of class
actions counsel, compelling them, for example, to make full “disclosure of
potential conflicts between class and attorney, or among class members
themselves.”251
Third, legislation must provide for mechanisms that can best ensure direct
participation by the actual parties “rather than exclusive reliance on class
counsel.”252 This should be balanced against the great deal of bargaining
power that class representatives must exercise in multilateral models. Then,
a proper mechanism to accommodate both interests at stake would be to
regulate a phase in the court proceeding in which interested parties have the
chance to make “suggestions about the settlement or object to its provisions,
without enjoying the right to litigate the underlying liability of the
defendant.”253 In other words, interested parties should be afforded a formal
hearing to suggest that contents or changes be introduced before the decree
can be approved or that, in certain cases, consent decrees be disapproved.254
In Argentina, class actions are not specifically and thoroughly regulated,
which translates, in turn, into the non-existence of any of these special
safeguards against possible conflicts of interest between counsel and some of
the class members or against collusion with the representatives of the
opposite party. Naturally, there are general provisions governing the practice
of law that hold attorneys criminally liable where they assume the defense of
adverse parties simultaneously or successively or deliberately prejudice their
client’s case.255 However, none of these provisions are specific enough to
249
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spell out the disclosures that counsel should make within the framework of a
class action lawsuit. There are no objective provisions to which the judges
or class members can look for guidance in determining who is qualified to
serve as class counsel.
Further, there is no law that formally contemplates the procedural devices
needed to ensure third-party intervention and a fairness hearing involving all
those potentially damaged. However, the proceedings in Verbitsky and
Mendoza have in fact included the holding of public hearings and the
establishment of collective bodies charged with opening dialogue pathways
and channeling citizen participation in monitoring the execution of the plan.
These public hearings notwithstanding, the standard used to grant the right to
formally intervene in the lawsuit, whether as a party proper or as a third party
entitled to participate and have its own say in the discussion, has at times
been too restrictive.
In Verbitsky, the Supreme Court issued, as stated earlier, a judgment for
relief and mandatorily set the core objectives of the reform plan, without
remanding the case to the provincial courts or without any active
involvement on the part of the respective governor. It has also been
mentioned that the “Dialogue Table” did not manage to stay operative over
the course of time. As for Mendoza, a flexible approach was used to
determine the persons who would serve as representatives for the the
plaintiff’s side and those who would stand on the defendants’ side.256
However, a rather restrictive approach was later favored in order to dismiss
other filings or refuse to hear other opinions that could have contributed
substantially to the case.257
Regarding the content and openness of the hearings at the Supreme Court,
it should be kept in mind that they were meant to pivot strictly on “certain
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core topics”258 and held for informational purposes only. In the words of the
Supreme Court, hearings usually served the objective of reporting on “the
degree of progress in complying with the orders made”259 but were not used
for revising the adequacy of such orders.
It is clear that the scope of these hearings should be established by law.
Not only to guarantee participation for informational purposes, but also to
check on class counsels and allow for robust citizen monitoring of the
content of consent decrees. Countries like Argentina should make
appropriate provision for the possibility of maintaining actions in which any
settlements reached are mandatorily binding on all class members; likewise,
provision ought to be made for the overall involvement of the MPF in all
matters in which a settlement or consent decree may be agreed upon.260
In sum, both settlements and consent decrees offer innumerable benefits
as instruments for the resolution of collective disputes. But the very nature
of collective rights calls for an analysis of the special conditions that must be
present for a fair settlement to be deemed feasible and mutually beneficial
for the parties involved.
3. Flexibility
Administrative activities are dynamic and rest on pragmatic decisions
calculated to suit the needs of a particular case; decisions must thus be
flexible enough to continuously adapt to a changing reality. Where
administrative activities are undertaken by judicial bodies, whose discourse
is naturally rights-oriented, the result can take the form of inadequacies and
conflicts that lead to inefficient management of social conflict and the
emasculation of the rights involved.
In the case of school desegregation, we have seen that top-down reform
plans like “busing” yielded an unwanted result. The fact that, in many states,
families moved to the suburbs to flee a forced integration “helped produce
258
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largely white suburbs ringing largely minority inner cities.”261 The origin of
this unwanted effect of resegregation can be traced to the somewhat rigid
approach originally employed to enforce Brown. Paradoxically, the white
flight and geographic resegregation “[were] fully consistent with Brown, or
perhaps more correctly, with what Brown had become.”262
This is why in those instances in which judicial intervention has been
particularly rigid, the impact of the reform has been weaker and
counterproductive effects have multiplied. Additionally, the crystallization
of certain standards adopted in a court decision or consent decree may have a
discouraging effect, and hinder the formulation of more ambitious objectives
beyond those set by the judges themselves. For example, it has been claimed
that “the very rigidity of the Jose P. decree and the process it required made
it more difficult for new mayors, new chancellors, or new boards of
education to improve the entire system.”263
These paradoxes are also very frequent in the environmental field. Here,
it is not at all uncommon for a particular group to “obtain a court order
forcing a local government to spend its scarce capital funds to meet a clean
water act requirement that has limited environmental benefit but that causes
the local government to delay other capital improvements that have greater
environmental benefits.”264
Logically enough, U.S. courts have acknowledged that structural reform
decisions or consent decrees may be amended, revised, or mitigated both in
the event of an “unforeseen” significant change in circumstances and when
the proposed modification is suitably tailored to the changed
circumstances.265 But this avenue for revision is difficult to use, so it must
be thoroughly regulated.
With regards to the situation in Latin America, it has been warned that
these paradoxical consequences can be even more acute than in other
regions. To the extent that inequality is more pronounced, certain groups
find it more difficult to gain access to the judicial system, and thus, judicial
decisions in the area of social rights are liable to have an overall adverse
effect on the poorer segments of society in terms of distribution.266
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In Argentina, despite the short track record in this field, it is clear that
allowance has been made for the premise of flexibility. In the Verbitsky
case, the establishment of a “Dialogue Table” by the Supreme Court was
aimed at affording the system the required flexibility and capacity for
ongoing adaptation of the objectives and orders issuing from the Judiciary.
At the same time, a negative aspect was that the original decision was
prepared without remanding it to the provincial courts and with scant
involvement of the Province of Buenos Aires. This entails high chances of
inadequacies in the quest for adjustment to the changing reality of a district
riddled with economic difficulties. It also may explain the inefficiency that
the “Dialogue Table” has had in actual practice.
As for Mendoza, it is worth noting that both the proceeding leading to the
issuance of the judgment and the subsequent enforcement proceedings were
handled as participatory channels, with a powerful response from the public
and a large number of hearings. Although the Supreme Court went perhaps
too far in restricting the formal participation of some relevant third parties
and that the public hearings before it were marked by excessive rigidity, it
should be conceded that, at least from a formal standpoint mechanisms were
properly introduced for judicial orders to become more flexible and to be
gradually adapted. It should also be mentioned that the enforcement court
held numerous hearings in order to exchange ideas with ACUMAR, the
municipal authorities, public utilities, and other players involved.267 In
addition, as stated by the Supreme Court itself, the reform plan consists of “a
program setting out objectives and results, the contents and timelines for
which have been accurately defined,”268 but includes no detailed
specification of the technical means to be employed, which choice has been
left to the discretion of the enforcement authorities. It is thus clear that the
reform plan was conceived with adequate flexibility.
V. CONCLUSION
From a purely practical standpoint, the comparative analysis of Public
Law Litigation experiences in the United States and Argentina reveals
disparate results. It becomes clear that the achievement of sustained longterm effectiveness and impact, depends crucially on certain political
conditions and technical requirements.
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With respect to the political conditions, the American experience suggests
that structural remedies are effective when the Judiciary acts with the support
of the political branches and in an institutional framework in which its
authority is undisputed. To this point, the Argentine experience confirms
this debated claim. The Supreme Court of Argentina has acted prudently,
making a restrictive use of an instrument that is still presented to society as
one to resort to in exceptional circumstances. It has thus been sensible to
address such issues as those involving the environment or prison conditions,
seeking to act in line with, rather than run counter to, the agenda of the other
branches of the federal government and of majority public opinion.
However, the Supreme Court of Argentina is still inherently weak within the
political system, so when the political momentum waned, the cases either
came to a standstill or experienced serious retrogression.
It can therefore be gleaned from these observations that resorting to
Public Law Litigation and structural reform as a legitimization strategy has
not been helpful enough for the Judiciary to claim for itself the authority
needed to prevail over the other branches of government. This lack of
authority proves to be a major obstacle to the successful use of both a
unilateral or a multilateral model of structural reform, because in the latter
case, the authority of the judge has an implicitly vital role to play. The
deadlock and corruption scandals in which the Argentine cases are now
caught, the lack of transparent management, and the absence of strongly
convincing results in the collective processes reviewed above can all actively
work against the Judiciary’s credibility. It follows that the political
conditions required for the effective employment of structural remedies do
not seem to be currently in place in Argentina, and this may explain the low
impact of the intended reform programs.
As for the technical side of the model, the comparative method shows that
Argentina, as well as many other Latin American countries, still suffers from
an objective deficit in its legislation. The lack of detailed statutory
regulation of a class action or collective claims system, explicitly designed to
accommodate Public Law Litigation, prevents judges and parties alike from
building an active front equipped with sufficient bargaining power. In
Argentina, the Supreme Court noticed this problem and attempted to solve it
with its decision in Halabi, holding informative hearings or with the creation
of ad hoc devices such as the “Dialogue Table” in Verbitsky. But these
judicial initiatives to close the statutory gap have been fruitless, so it comes
as no surprise that the implementation of a multilateral model of structural
reform has so far proved impossible. Thus, the Argentine case confirms the
necessity of legislating thoroughly this area of procedural law, designing a
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special class action framework following the path of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure as amended in 1966, and addressing the many agency
problems that regularly arise in this context.
In short, the theoretical model developed in this Article, reveals that
countries like Argentina still face objective barriers in both the political and
the technical spheres that account for the low impact that the use of structural
remedies has had to this day. Aware of these deficiencies, and confronted
with dramatic situations such as those underlying the Verbitsky and Mendoza
cases, the Argentine Supreme Court stepped boldly onto the scene. It
probably hoped that its decided action in these areas might earn for itself the
authority it then lacked, and that it might fill the void of technical
instruments with case-by-case solutions. Evidence shows, however, that it
does not seem possible to use shortcuts and jump to a quick and effective
application of sophisticated multilateral models of structural remedies
without first laying solid foundations through the adoption of other
legitimization strategies.
Without the proper institutional framework, the Judiciary cannot rely on
structural reform as a starting point for a legitimization strategy; as that is, at
best, a final destination. Much to the contrary, such a strategy may result in
the loss of its main symbolic capital, as structural reform cases bring judges
fully into the political arena and drives them away from the prestigious,
traditional paradigm of neutral players.
Finally, the Argentine experience confirms once again that in many cases
judicialization leads to demobilization and paradoxical results. This may
cause major delays in reforms and harm the victim groups. It is thus
advisable for legal activists and stakeholders to channel their resources into
ensuring the fulfillment of political conditions and technical requirements
that will ultimately enable the Judiciary to employ more effective forms of
intervention.

